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A group of individuals  repeatedly  plays  a  fixed extensive-form  game,  using 
past  play to forecast future  actions.  Each (asymptotically)  maximizes  his own 
immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical 
frequencies  of past play.  Because  players  observe only the path of play in each 
round,  they may not learn how others act in parts of the game tree that are not 
reached  infinitely often.  Hence, differences  and correlations  in beliefs about out- 
of-equilibrium actions may persist indefinitely. The stable points of these learning 
processes are  self-confirming  equilibria,  a weaker solution  concept than  Nash 
equilibria.  Journal of Economic  Literature Classification  Numbers: C72,  D83. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In a  Nash equilibrium,  each player's beliefs  about the strategies  of his 
opponents are exactly correct. This paper investigates the idea that players 
may come to have  correct,  or at  least  approximately  correct,  beliefs  as 
the  result  of a  process  of learning  from experience.  The  idea,  as  in  the 
literature  on fictitious  play,  is  that  players play  the game  repeatedly  (or 
observe repeated play prior to their own turn to play) and expect that the 
current play of their opponents will resemble the way the opponents have 
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played in the past. It is easy to prove that if players observe the strategies 
chosen by their opponents and their beliefs come to resemble the empirical 
distribution, then if behavior converges to a steady state (at least, in pure 
strategies), the steady state will be a Nash equilibrium. Thus the focus of 
interest  in the  literature  related to fictitious play has been on questions 
of whether behavior will converge and, to a lesser extent, on the prospects 
(and modes) of convergence to mixed strategy equilibria.l 
This  paper  studies learning  processes in the general  style of fictitious 
play under the assumption that players observe only the actions that are 
actually played in a given extensive-form game, and not the actions that 
their  opponents  would  have  chosen  at  information  sets  that  were  not 
reached in the course of play. 2 Thus repeated observations of opponents' 
play  need  not  lead  to  correct  beliefs about  their  full  strategies,  which 
prescribe actions at all information  sets. All that can be expected if play 
converges is that players come to have correct beliefs about behavior at 
information sets that lie along the path of play. Two players might persis- 
tently maintain  different beliefs about how a third player would respond 
to  a  deviation  from  the  path  of play,  and  one  player  might  persist  in 
correlated beliefs concerning the actions of other players whose informa- 
tion sets lie off the path of play. 
Since both of these phenomena can support non-Nash outcomes, learn- 
ing processes need nbt lead to Nash equilibrium absent some reason (such 
as experimentation with off-path actions or restrictions on the prior beliefs) 
for players to have correct beliefs about off-path play. Rather, the set of 
possible stable points is the set of self-confirming equilibria. 3 
Throughout we work in the style of the literature on bounded rationality. 
That  is,  we exogenously  specify behavior  rules  for the  players,  rather 
i There are many papers in this literature; see Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)  for a  partial 
bibliography. 
2 In this paper we restrict attention to extensive-form stage games and the problems raised 
by off-the-path information sets, but similar issues arise whenever players observe something 
less than the full (pure) strategies their opponents have chosen. For example, players might 
observe only their own actions and payoffs. 
3 The basic idea of a  self-confirming equilibrium--that players need have correct beliefs 
only about those elements of play that they observe--appears in the literature as early as 
Hahn's (1977)  notion of conjectural equilibrium. Recent formalizations and analyses in a 
game-theoretic context include Battigalli (1987),  Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988),  Rubinstein 
and Wolinsky (1990),  Fudenberg and Levine (1993a,b), and Kalai and Lehrer (1993a,b,c). 
Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) concern explicit learning models; 
their results present an interesting contrast with the results given here. 
Our specific definition, and the name we use, is taken from Fudenberg and Levine (1993a), 
with one  simplification: They  study  a  learning model  with a  large  number of players  I, 
players 2, etc.,  which leads them to a definition of self-confirming equilibrium that allows 
the (off-the-path) beliefs of different players  1 to differ. The definition we use corresponds 
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than  deriving  behavior  from  utility  maximization.  Moreover,  although 
players are trying to use past observations to learn their opponents' play, 
their learning rules need not be objectively valid. In particular,  they act 
as if the process is converging to a steady state even though this need not 
be  the  case.  Finally,  as  in  the  traditional  literature  on  fictitious  play, 
players treat their opponents'  future play as exogenous, even though in 
the processes we consider this is false; a patient player might be able to 
do better by trying to "teach" his opponents that he will play in a particular 
way. 
The context for the analysis is given in Section 2.  Sections 3, 4, and 5 
adapt asymptotic empiricism,  asymptotic myopia, and stability from the 
context of Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)--where stage-game (pure) strate- 
gies are fully observable--to the current context.  In particular,  because 
players can affect what they observe about the actions of others, we allow 
conscious experimentation. 
Section 6 reviews the concept of self-confirming equilibrium, providing 
illustrative examples and a characterization  for two-player games. 
Section 7 contains  our basic results:  In any model where beliefs and 
behavior satisfy our assumptions,  asymptotic steady states must be self- 
confirming equilibria, and any self-confirming equilibrium is an asymptotic 
steady state for some model that meets our assumptions. 
In  Section 7  we discuss asymptotic  stability of strategy profiles.  We 
extend these results slightly in Section 8, to asymptotic stability of out- 
comes, or probability distributions induced by strategy profiles over termi- 
nal  nodes:  Only  outcomes that  correspond  to  self-confirming equilibria 
can be asymptotic steady states. 
Our analysis  raises  the  question  of when  players  might  be expected 
to learn  enough  about  the  off-path play of their  opponents  to preclude 
convergence  to  a  non-Nash  outcome.  Section 9  presents  one  way that 
this could happen,  viz., if players consistently "tremble"  in the sense of 
Selten (1975).  In a  companion paper,  Fudenberg and  Kreps  (1994),  we 
investigate whether and when conscious experimentation by the players 
rules out non-Nash steady states. 
2.  PRELIMINARIES 
A  finite /-player  extensive-form  game  with  perfect  recall,  called  the 
stage game,  is played repeatedly by the same I  players,  at dates t  =  1, 
2,3 ..... 
The game tree for the stage game is denoted by V:  <  denotes prece- 
dence, Z  C_ V is the subset of terminal nodes, and X  =  V\Z is the set of 
action nodes. The information sets h E  H partition X: h(x) is the informa- 
tion set containing x,  i(h) is the player who moves at h,  H; is the set of LEARNING  IN  EXTENSIVE-FORM  GAMES  23 
player i's information sets, and H -i =  H\H  i denotes the information sets 
of i's opponents. The feasible actions at h are denoted by A(h).  Actions 
are labeled so that A(h) tq A(h') = Oforh ~  h'; h(a) denotes the information 
set .at  which  a  is  feasible.  The  set  of feasible  actions  for player i,  or 
t.JheniA(h),  is denoted by Ai; A -i denotes the set of feasible actions for 
i's opponents.  All of Nature's  moves (if any) are placed at the start of 
the tree, so that each move by Nature corresponds to an initial node of 
the tree• The  set of initial nodes is denoted by  W; we suppose that the 
objective distribution ~b over these initial nodes is strictly positive and is 
known to all the players. 4 Player i's payoff if terminal node z is reached 
is ui(z). Player i knows his own payoff  function u;; we are agnostic whether 
players know the payoff functions of their opponents,  but some of our 
assumptions and examples will seem more natural if we suppose that they 
do not. 
The set of pure strategies for player i in the stage game is denoted by 
Si;  s i  E  S i,  if si:  H i ~  A i  such  that si(h)  E  A(h).  The  space  of mixed 
(behavior)  strategies for i is denoted 1-I i; lr / E  fli if zr/: H i ~  A(A(hi)), 
5  the set ofprobability distributions over A(h).  Pure and behaviorally mixed 
strategy profiles are denoted by s  and 7r and are elements of S  =  I-I; S i 
and 1-I =  IIi 1-I i, respectively. Pure and behaviorally mixed strategy profiles 
for all players except i are denoted by s -i and 7r -i, coming from the sets 
S -i  =  1-Ij# i S j  and I-I -i  =  I-lie  i IIJ. 
Each  strategy profile 7r induces a  probability distribution P(.l~r)  over 
the terminal nodes,  computed under the assumption that each player's 
behavior is independent of the behavior of others. The support of P(.l¢r) 
is denoted by Z(Tr); X(Tr) and H(Tr) will denote the set of all non-terminal 
nodes and information sets that have positive probability under 7r, respec- 
tively. 
Each play of the game at a  given date results in a  particular terminal 
node z  E  Z  being reached, so the history  at the beginning of date t is an 
element ~t =  (z~ .....  z,_~). (For t =  1, ~  is used conventionally to denote 
the initial [informationless] history.) We assume that all players observe 
the outcome at the end of each round, so that all players known ~t at the 
start of round t. 6 We use ~ to denote an infinite history of play (z~,  z2, 
•  .  .), ~  to denote the space of all infinite histories (so that ~  =  (Z)=),  and 
4 As long as ~b is known to players, putting all of nature's moves at the start of the tree 
is without loss of generality. If we had players learning nature's probabilities, complications 
arise; see footnote 6 following. 
5 We reserve E i for the space of mixed strategies for player i, i.e., E i =  A(S/). 
6 This is why the placement of nature's moves matters when players are learning ~b. Placing 
nature's moves at the start implies that players will see all of nature's moves in each round; 
if some of nature's moves are placed in an unreached portion of the tree, they will not be 
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~t to denote the space of all histories up to time t (so that ~t =  (Z)t-l) .7 
We implicitly assume that all players know from the outset the exten- 
sive-form structure of the stage game. Each player assumes that his own 
behavior 7r i and the behaviors 7rJ of each of his rivals are independent, 
so that  if i plays according to ~i and  is certain  that  (each) rivalj plays 
according to ~'J, then the outcome of the game will be the terminal  node 
z with probability P(zlzr). 
3.  BELIEFS,  ASSESSMENTS,  AND  ASYMPTOTIC  EMPIRICISM 
The behavior of each player at any date t will depend on the history of 
play up to that date and, more particularly, on what each player believes 
to be the joint strategies being chosen by his rivals. While a very general 
formulation would specify each player's probability assessment over strat- 
egy selection rules of his opponents for each and every future date,  we 
will make do keeping track of each player's beliefs about the joint strategies 
of his rivals for the current round of play, as a function of past play. 
3.1.  Beliefs and Assessments 
Player i's  beliefs  about his  opponents'  play will be represented  by a 
probability measure y/over the set H -i of behavior strategies for player 
i's opponents.  That is, for A C_ H -i, yi(A) is i's probabilistic beliefs that 
his  rivals'  strategy profile  will be some (independently  mixed)  strategy 
profile  ~.-i  contained  in  the  set  A.  As  y; is  not  necessarily  a  product 
measure over II -i, player i's beliefs can reflect correlation in his opponent's 
strategy selection. 
Given beliefs y/, player i's assessment ix  i about what will happen if he 
plays strategy "/F i is obtained  by integrating P(-I ~i, ~-i)  with respect to 
player i's beliefs: 
[£i(z[,71. i, .y i) :  fH -i P(zlTr i, 7r-i).y i [d,.B.-i].  (3.1) 
That is, the assessment/~i is the marginal distribution over terminal nodes 
induced by player i's beliefs and player i's intentions. 
Suppose that i has a single rival, j, who must choose between two pure 
strategies,  and  suppose that i assesses that it is equally likely that j  will 
choose either pure strategy.  Having a formalism for i's beliefs allows us 
to distinguish  between the case where i believes with certainty that j  is 
7 In general, subscripts will denote time and superscripts will denote players. The excep- 
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playing the corresponding mixed strategy and the case where i believes 
that there is probability 1/2 thatj will play one or the other pure strategy. 
These two situations are equivalent in a static setting, but may have very 
different implications about what i will learn from observingj. 8 
3.2.  Belief Rules 
We imagine that for each player i, date t, and partial history ~t, i holds 
beliefs 5' i(~t) about the strategy profile that his rivals are about to play. 
The  term beliefs  rule  will be  used to  refer to  a  full specification of i's 
beliefs, as a function of time and history, denoted by 5' ;. (The hat is used 
to distinguish between i's full array of beliefs, for all dates and histories, 
and  a  particular  probability  distribution  on  II  -i,  that  is,  a  single ~/i  = 
A  special case is where i uses Bayesian inference: player i views the 
successive selections of his rivals as i.i.d, draws from some fixed but (to 
player i) unknown strategy profile,  9 and, relative to this prior assessment, 
player i uses Bayes' rule to update his beliefs. In symbols, if 5'~(~t) gives 
i's beliefs at the start of round t,  player i uses (pure)  strategy s i in this 
round, and the resulting outcome is z, then i's posterior beliefs are given 
by 
f A e(zls',  i(~,)(d~  --i) 
5' i+ ~(g,, z)(A) =  ,  (3.2) 
fn-' e( zls', rr-') 5' i(g,)(  drr-i) 
for A  C_ H-; (assuming the denominator is positive.) 
3.3.  Asymptotically  Empirical Beliefs 
We confine attention to belief rules that are asymptotically  empirical, 
in  the  rough  sense  that  for  any player  i  and  information set h  E  H J, 
j  #  i, if h is hit fairly often as time passes, then i becomes more and more 
certain  that j's  choice  of strategy  entails  a  choice  of action  at  h  that 
(asymptotically) equals the empirical frequency distribution ofj's choices 
at h. 
The following notational definitions are required to make this precise: 
(1)  For all ~t, h  E  H, and a  E  A, let K(h; ~t) be the number of times 
that information set h has been reached and let K(a; ~t) be the number of 
8 Compare with the analysis in Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), where we formalized  (only) 
i's joint probability  assessment over the pure strategy profile of his rivals, a concept closest 
to assessments as defined here. 
9 That is, player i assesses the sequence of selections by his rivals as exchangeable. 26  FUDENBERG  AND  KREPS 
times a  is played in the t -  I plays of the game recorded by ~t. Note that 
~aEA(h)  K(o;  ~t)  =  K(h; Ct). 
(2)  For all  ~t and  h  E  H  such that  K(h; ~t) >  0, define a  probability 
distribution #(h; ~,) on A(h) by 
K(a; ~t)  for all a EA(h).  fr(h; ~,)(a) -  K(h; ~t) 
(3)  For all ~ E ~, let Hp.r.(~) be those information sets that are reached 
a  strictly  positive fraction  of the  time  along the  history  ~,  using a  limit 
infimum test; i.e.,  h E  Hp.f.(~) if lim inf,__,= K(h; ~t)/t >  O. 
DEFINITION.  Player i's belief rule ~/" is asymptotically empirical if for 
every e >  0,  infinite history ~, j  #  i, and information set hJ E  Hp.f.(~)  f) 
H j , 
lim '~ i(~,)({1r-/:  II~-J(h J)  -  ¢r (hi; 011 <  =  l  (3.3) 
That is, player i assigns probability tending to zero to strategy profiles 
~--" in which,  at the information  set M  E  H j, playerj plays something e 
or more different from the empirical distribution overj's actions at M. 
This  definition compounds two basic features:  (1) i's  strategic  uncer- 
tainty about what j  does at h J vanishes  if evidence about j's play at h J 
accumulates sufficiently quickly; (2) all past evidence is (asymptotically) 
equally  weighted.  For example,  if i believes his  rival's  actions  are  ex- 
changeable and  i computes beliefs using Bayesian inference,  i.e.,  (3.2), 
and if his initial prior beliefs 3' 'i are non-doctrinaire in the sense of assigning 
positive probability to every open neighborhood of l-I-;, then his beliefs are 
asymptotically empirical. More generally, asymptotic empiricism holds if 
i believes that  the  behavior strategies  of his  rivals  will converge to the 
play of some single fixed profile, he uses Bayesian inference, and no finite 
set  of observations  causes  him  to  attach  zero  probability  to  the  limit 
strategy profile lying in some open set. 
In  contrast,  suppose i believes that  rival j  chooses  some  (unknown) 
behavior  strategy  repeatedly,  except that  at  (random  and  unobserved) 
dates, j  changes that behavior strategy to some other.  Then i's strategic 
uncertainty will (for most specifications) never vanish; if there is a constant 
nonzero  probability  that  at  any date  t j  redraws  her behavior strategy, 
then no matter how sure i becomes that he knows whatj has been playing 
"lately," his prediction aboutj's behavior in the next round must include 
the (nonvanishing)  chance thatj has shifted to some new strategy. More- 
over, i will naturally put somewhat more weight on past observations of LEARNING  IN  EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES  27 
what j  has been doing than  on observations in the far distant  past.  So, 
for this case, neither part of asymptotic empiricism is valid. 
3.4.  Asymptotic Independence 
Because asymptotic empiricism entails vanishing strategic uncertainty 
at information sets reached a nonvanishing fraction of the time, it implicitly 
entails  asymptotic independence. An  example  illustrates  the  problem: 
Imagine  a  three-player  game  in  which  players  1 and  2  each  have  two 
actions between which they must choose simultaneously in each period; 
up or down for player 1, and left or right for player 2. Consider a history 
along  which  the  limiting  frequencies  of up-left,  up-right,  down-left, 
and down-right are 0.4, 0.1,0.1, and 0.4, respectively. If player 3's beliefs 
are asymptotically empirical, then in the limit player 3 will assess probabil- 
ity 0.25  (=  0.5  x  0.5)  and  not 0.4 that  his  rivals' joint  actions  will  be 
up-left. 
To understand  how this can happen,  return to the example of player i 
forming beliefs according to Bayes' rule as in (3.2), beginning with a non- 
doctrinaire  prior  on  the  space  17-;. Player  i,  observing  a  sequence  of 
actions  by  two rivals  as  in  the  previous  paragraph,  will  come  to  the 
conclusion that they are about to play up-left with probability 0.25, be- 
cause i's prior assessment puts probability one on the event that his rivals 
choose their strategies simultaneously and independently, and in Bayesian 
inference, no amount of evidence (that has positive prior likelihood) can 
cause a prior-probability-zero event to assume positive probability. Player 
i may well believe in  correlation  at  any finite time  t,  but the  extent of 
correlation  must vanish as time passes and his strategic uncertainty  (by 
assumption) vanishes. 
The reasonableness of this property of beliefs is tied up with our content- 
ion that players know the informational conditions under which the stage 
game is played, together with the implicit assumption that all mechanisms 
by which players could objectively coordinate or correlate their play are 
recorded  in the extensive form of the game.  Correlated  assessments  of 
rivals' play can reflect one's own strategic uncertainty, but as that strategic 
uncertainty  vanishes,  so  must  any  correlation,  ff we  assume  that  (for 
our players) strategic uncertainty vanishes at information sets reached a 
nonvanishing  fraction of the time, asymptotic independence is forced. 
We  are  not  entirely  happy  with  asymptotic  independence,  which  of 
course reflects unhappiness with asymptotic empiricism as defined above. 
In the face of strong evidence to the contrary, players ought to question 
whether they understand  the informational  structure  of the stage game. 
But to  "fix"  this  problem constitutes a  substantial  diversion.  For now, 
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noting this  unpalatable  implication;  we  return  to  it  (briefly)  in  closing 
remarks. 
4.  BEHAVIOR RULES,  EXPERIMENTATION,  AND ASYMPTOTIC MYOPIA 
A  behavior  rule  for  player  i  specifies  how  'i  will  act  at  each 
date for each history. Formally, this is given by a  sequence of functions 
¢r i =  (¢r'i, ~'~ ....  ), where 7r  t^  i has domain ~t and range 1-I i. 
Given beliefs y ~, we denote player i's expected current payoffto strategy 
~r i by ui(Tr i, 7 i), which is 
Hi(Tr i, ~1 i) =  Z  ]'~i(ZlT~ i, ]li)tli(z). 
zEZ 
We also write ui(~  -i,  7r -~) for i's expected  payoff if he plays 7r; and  his 
rivals play according to 7r -~. 
In our earlier work on learning in strategic-form games,  we assumed 
that behavior rules were asymptotically  myopic with respect to the player's 
beliefs  in  the following sense:  There  exists  a  sequence  of nonnegative 
numbers {e,} such that lim,_~ e, =  0 and, for each t and ~t, 
ui( "h" i(~,), T ~(~,))  +  e, -> max ui(s i, ~ i(~t)). 
si~S i 
(4.1) 
(This is not quite our original formulation, as it must be adapted here to 
deal with beliefs.)  We  offered some rationales for this  assumption and 
discussed its merits and drawbacks. Very briefly, if players discount the 
future very heavily, and/or they believe that, at least asymptotically, their 
actions will not affect the strategies of their rivals, then asymptotic myopia 
is reasonable. Moreover, one can cobble together stories of various forms 
of random matching among large populations of players to justify either 
a large discount rate and/or the hypothesis that one's future rivals' actions 
are asymptotically unaffected by one's own current actions.1° 
In this paper,  we wish to proceed  in a  similar spirit and assume that 
players'  behavior rules  are  asymptotically myopic with respect  to their 
belief rules.  But the extension to our current context of learning to play 
an extensive-form game is not straightforward for at least two reasons. We 
discuss the two complications and then reformulate asymptotic myopia. 
~0 Ellison (1993) provides conditions under which a  patient  rational  player can improve 
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(0,0)  ~  Player 2  Player 1 
Up ~@  _ 
(3,1) "~Down  -  Left  0  Right 
_-_-_  (2,2) 
FIG.  1.  An extensive-form game. 
4.1.  Ex ante  or ex post Expectations? 
The first complication concerns the stage game depicted in Fig. 1. Imag- 
ine player 2 entertains beliefs that player 1 will play Right with probability 
p  close to one.  Then the  strategy  Up is  not at all costly to player 2  ex 
ante:  Choosing Up is suboptimal by the ex ante expected amount  1 -  p. 
Thus if player 1 plays Right increasingly often, player 2 (with asymptoti- 
cally empirical beliefs) sees the choice of Up as vanishingly suboptimal. 
And if player 2 persists with  Up, then player  I  will (probably) be more 
and more inclined to choose Right. 
But if player 2 is ever called upon to move, it is clear ex post that the 
choice of Up will cost her one unit of payoff. We are inclined to say that 
"suboptimality  cost  calculations"  should  be formulated  in  terms  of ex 
post expected payoffs, so that player 2 may not persist with Up whenever 
given the chance,  even if player  1 chooses Right with a frequency that 
approaches one. 
Notwithstanding this inclination, in this paper we formulate asymptotic 
myopia using  ex  ante  expected payoff calculations.  By so doing we are 
using a weaker form of asymptotic myopia, which permits more behavior 
rules to qualify. After seeing the consequences of this weak assumption on 
behavior rules, we might wish later to explore what happens if asymptotic 
myopia is formulated on the basis of ex post expected payoffs. But that 
must await another paper (by ourselves or others). 
4.2.  Experimentation 
The second complication can also be posed in terms of the stage game 
in  Fig.  I,  with  the emphasis  now on the behavior of player  1.  Imagine 
that player 1 believes that player 2 will choose Up in each round indepen- 
dently with some probability p  and player  l's initial beliefs are that p  is 
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Then in the first round player 1  's marginal 
assessment is that player 2 will choose Up with probability 1/2, and player 
l's immediate expectations favor the choice of Right. If player 1 chooses 
Right, he does not receive any information about the value of p, because 
player 2 is not given the opportunity to move.  So in the second round, 
l's beliefs remain his prior,  and again short-run  considerations lead to a 
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his expected payoff in each round, given his beliefs, he will choose Right 
in each round.  But if player I does not discount the future very heavily, 
he may choose to play Left for some period of time to learn the value of 
p; if the data lead to the conclusion that p <  1/3 (which has prior probability 
1/3 according to player 1), Left becomes short-run optimal. 
In the context of learning to play a strategic-form game, in which each 
player learns his rivals' pure strategies after each round of play,a player 
who believes that  his own actions do not affect the subsequent choices 
of his rivals will wish to play whatever strategy maximizes his immediate 
expected payoff. If a player believes that his own actions will asymptoti- 
cally have no impact on the actions of his rivals, then asymptotic myopia 
is mandated. ~ But in the current context of learning to play an extensive 
game,  this  argument  fails  because  the  player's  immediate  actions  can 
affect what he learns about his rivals' behavior. 
4.3.  Experiments Taken  at Random and Asymptotic Myopia 
The challenge,  then,  is to formulate a general property in the spirit of 
asymptotic  myopia that  allows  players  to  experiment  with  suboptimal 
strategies, to learn more about how their rivals act in otherwise unreached 
parts of the game tree. The first thing to note in this regard is that experi- 
mentation of a particular kind is possible within the confines of condition 
(4.1); viz., condition (4. I) does not preclude experiments taken at random: 
Suppose that in round t each player chooses each available (pure) strategy 
for the extensive-form game with probability at least a/t for some constant 
a. With the remaining probability, each player chooses any strategy that 
is optimal with respect to his beliefs. Then the degree of suboptimality of 
the overall mixed strategy used by the player (computed, of course, on 
an ex ante basis) vanishes as time passes. And it is an easy consequence 
of the Borel-Cantelli lemma that each player will (almost surely) use each 
pure strategy infinitely often over the course of play. ~2 
4.4.  Asymptotic Myopia with Conscious  Experiments 
We wish to weaken the condition for asymptotic myopia, (4.1), to permit 
players to adopt behavior rules that experiment with suboptimal actions 
ii We are not being precise about what is meant by "asymptotically has no impact," so 
this is somewhat loose. 
tz Note,  however,  that players need not take every action infinitely often,  not even at 
information sets that are reached infinitely often. To take a simple example, in the game in 
Fig.  1,  imagine that player  !  chooses  Left  in round t  with probability  l/t,  and player 2 
chooses Up in round t with probability 1/t,  independently of what player 1 has done. Then 
player 2 is almost surely given infinitely many chances to act, but the combination Left-Up 
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with  probability  one in  specific circumstances,  as long  as these  experi- 
ments are not taken too often in a time-average  sense. We wish to permit 
these sorts of nonrandom  experiments  on two grounds:  First,  our intent 
is to allow as broad a  class of behavior rules as we can, and while some 
decision makers may be content with experiments taken at random, other 
decision  makers  may  choose  their  experiments  at  specific times  and  in 
specific  circumstances,  albeit  at  vanishing  frequency.  For  example,  a 
player who envisions  himself as facing a  multi-armed  bandit,  with a  dis- 
counted  payoff criterion,  will not optimally  conduct  randomized  experi- 
ments.  Second, and related to this, a player's decision whether to experi- 
ment  may  well  depend  on  the  outcome  of his  past  experiments.  For 
example, if a player chooses a suboptimal action in period t with probabil- 
ity a/t,  there is positive probability that,  at any given time  T, the player 
has  yet  actually  to  try  the  experiment.  We  do  not  wish  to  preclude  a 
player from  deciding,  in  this  circumstance,  to  run  the experiment  once 
and for all (finally) to get some information. 
We make the following definition. 
DEFINITION.  Fix  i and  i's  beliefs rule ~/;. The  behavior  rule 5.; for i 
is asymptotically  myopic  with calendar-time  limitations  on experimenta- 
tion  if there  exist:  (1)  a  sequence  of strictly  positive  numbers  {et} with 
lim/._,~ et =  0,  (2) a  nondecreasing  sequence of nonnegative  integers  {~t; 
t  =  1, 2 ....  } with lim/__,= "ot/t  =  0,  (3) behavior rules #; and ~- i for i, and 
(4) for each t,  ~t, and h  E  H i, a  number &i(~,)(h)  E  [0,  1],  such that: 
(a)  For  all  t,  ~,,  and  h  E  H i,  ¢ri(~t)(h)  =  &i(~,)(h)  x  5.~(~t)(h)  + 
(1  -  ~(~,)(h))  x  #~(~,)(h). 
(b)  For  all  t,  ~t,  and  h  E  H i,  lli(5.~(~t),  ~/i(~t) )  -F  8t  ~  maxd~d 
ll;( S i, "y i( ~t) ) . 
(c)  If &i(~,)(h)  <  1,  then  K(o~'; ~t)  -<  "0t  for  some  a'  E  A(h),  and 
¢ri([t)(h)  gives  positive  probability  only  to  actions  a  ~  A(h)  such  that 
K(a;  ~,)  --< ~,. 
To  explain:  Condition  (a)  says  that  at  date  t  with  history  ~t,  5.~(gt) 
prescribes  behavior at information  set h that is a convex combination  of 
two pieces: 5. ~(~,)(h) and fi" i(~,)(h).  We imagine that player i decides, infor- 
mation set by information set, whether to conduct a conscious experiment. 
We interpret  the 5; part  as player  i's  nonexperimental  behavior and 5.; 
as player i's experimentation,  so if & i(~t)(h)  =  l,  player i has decided not 
to experiment  at h.  Condition  (b) says that i's nonexperimental  behavior 
is vanishingly  suboptimal.  Condition  (c)  says that  if player i chooses  to 
experiment at h at all, that is, if~ti(~t)(h)  <  l, then he must be experimenting 
with  actions  a  ~  A(h)  that  have  been taken  fewer than  ~t times  in the 
past.  Since "ot/t  ~  0  as t ~  0% this  means  that  experiments  are taken  a 
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We call this asymptotic myopia with calendar-time limitations on experi- 
mentation because the player is allowed to experiment freely with actions 
that have been taken "infrequently" relative to calendar time. If informa- 
tion  set  h  is  visited  a  vanishing  frequency  of time--more  precisely  if 
K(h; ~t) <  ~  for all t along the history ~--then i is free to take any actions 
that he wishes at the information set h.  Thus i's behavior at information 
sets that are reached rarely enough is unrestrained by asymptotic myopia. 
Note that  although  we refer to the/r" part of i's behavior strategy as 
nonexperimental,  (r i can incorporate experiments taken at random, as per 
our discussion above. 
Is it reasonable to suppose that a boundedly rational player will behave 
asymptotically  myopically with  experiments  that  vanish  with  calendar 
time? To answer this question, two issues must be addressed. First, hold- 
ing aside the question of experiments, is asymptotic myopia at all sensible? 
Again,  we  will  not  attempt  to  defend  this  behavioral  postulate  here; 
Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (1993)  gave our rationales  for it.  Second,  in this 
setting where actions can influence what information is received, so that 
experiments may be reasonable forms of behavior, is it sensible to insist 
that  the frequency of experimentation  vanish  with calendar  time  in  the 
sense of the definition, or might it be reasonable for someone to experiment 
more frequently than this? 
There are certainly scenarios in which this definition is too restrictive. 
For example,  if player i  supposed that  his  opponents  played the  same 
profile of behavior strategies repeatedly but, at random times, shifted to 
some other profile, then experimentation at a nonvanishing rate is entirely 
reasonable.  But if asymptotic  empiricism  is justified--if i believes that 
his rivals will asymptotically settle into repeated play of a given strategy 
profile--"the  value  of information"  to  be obtained  in  any  experiment 
presumably diminishes  to zero the more often the experiment  is taken, 
and thus the frequency of experimentation  should vanish. 
4.4.  Rationalizing Calendar-Time Limitations: Players  Who Compare 
the Sum of Immediate  and Future Payoffs 
To  explain  this  last  sentence,  and  to  shed  light  on  our definition  of 
asymptotic  myopia,  it  helps  to  delve a  bit deeper into  the  calculations 
that might guide the behavior of player i. Note well, we do not mean to 
limit  ourselves  to  players  who  reason  in  this  fashion;  this  is  only  an 
example. Also, we will not be precise. In particular we sluff over details 
having to do with players who move more than once along paths through 
the game tree. 
Imagine player i chooses behavior at date t as follows. For each pure 
strategy s i ~  S i, i has immediate expected payoff ui(s  i, ~ i(~t)). Suppressing 
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addition, i has some sense of his "current-value expected future payoffs" 
if he chooses s" this period, which we abbreviate fi(s~).  We suppose that 
i chooses from among those pure strategies s" that satisfy ui(s i)  + fi(s i)  + 
e;  -> max~i ui(3 i)  + fi(~i),  for some e;  ~  0. 
Suppose (withough justification just yet) that 
for some sequence 8~---~ O,fi(s i) _fi(~i)  _< 8,(sil  ' for all s i and ~i,  (4.2) 
where K(s ~) is the number of times s; has been attempted• Let ~t be any 
nondecreasing sequence of positive integers with ~t ~  ~  and 'ot/t  ~  O, 
and let et  =  e;  +  8nt. Then i (choosing as we have imagined) will satisfy 
asymptotic myopm for "0, and et: If s ~  has been tried "0t times or more by 
time t, then it can be better in terms of future value than any other strategy 
by at most 8nt.  Thus if it is worse than some other strategy in terms of 
current  value by  more  than e,,  then  it  must be  worse  than this  other 
strategy in terms of current plus future value by at least e;, and s i will 
not (therefore) be chosen. 
Can we justify the uniform bound in (4.2)?  Suppose player i believes 
at the outset that his rivals are playing according to some fixed strategy 
profile.  If i discounts his payoffs using some discount rate less than  1, 
f~(s i) is the future value function of a problem very much like the classic 
multi-armed bandit problem, where each pure strategy s E  S; that i might 
choose corresponds to one arm of the bandit• The problem differs from 
the standard bandit model in that the returns to the various arms may be 
correlated, but the solution to this "extensive-form bandit" has many of 
the features of the  solution to  the  case of independent arms. ~3  In this 
setting,  (4.2)  has  appeal  along the  following intuitive lines:  The  more 
"arm" s" is tried, the more is learned about the consequences of trying 
this strategy, and the less there is to learn• 
This intuition (and the uniform bound in (4•2)) holds for standard multi- 
armed bandit problems, as long as prior beliefs are non-doctrinaire. But 
it fails in general for extensive-form bandit problems,  as  the following 
example indicates• Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2. (Only player l's 
payoffs matter, so only they are given.) Imagine that player 1 believes at 
the outset that players 2, 3, and 4 will repeatedly play mixed strategies, 
with p the probability with which player 2 chooses Left, q the probability 
that player 3  chooses left, and r  the probability that player 4  chooses 
gauche. Player 1 initially believes that (p, q, r) has uniform distribution 
on the unit cube, which makes Out the short-run optimal strategy. But if 
pqr  is  low enough, In would be better for player  I, and  so with small 
u Fudenberg and Levine (!993b) analyze optimal solutions to extensive-form bandit 
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FIG.  2.  A  troublesome example. Only player l's payoffs are given. 
enough discount rate, player I would optimally choose In, to learn about 
the values of p,  q,  and  r.  Now imagine that whenever player  1 chooses 
In, either Left-right or Right-left is observed, each with limiting frequency 
I/2. Assuming that player 1  's beliefs are strongly asymptotically empirical, 
player 1 comes to conclude that p = q -- 1/2. By asymptotic independence, 
player  1 believes that  there is  1/4 chance that,  if he chooses In,  he will 
(finally) learn something about the value of r.  Until something is learned 
about r,  In  remains  short-run  suboptimal by an  amount  bounded away 
from zero.  But as long as  l's  discount rate  is very small,  the expected 
value of information obtained from In more than makes up for this short- 
run  suboptimality.  Along  the  path  where  2  and  3  alternate  between 
Right-left  and  Left-right,  player  1 never abandons  In,  despite the fact 
that  this  strategy remains  distinctly  suboptimal.  N.B.,  the  strategy em- 
ployed by player  1,  which  is an optimal  strategy according  to dynamic 
programming  given  l's  initial  beliefs, will fail to  meet our definition  of 
asymtotic myopia; hence the definition unduly limits the amount of experi- 
mentation that player 1 may undertake. 
Comparing this example with the result we claim for standard, indepen- 
dent-arms bandit problem, it is clear where the difficulty arises, viz., from 
the players' doctrinaire belief that their opponents'  play is uncorrelated 
(despite their non-doctrinaire beliefs over the strategy of each individual 
opponent), which they maintain no matter how strongly the data suggest 
otherwise.  This  suggests that abandonment  of asymptotic independence 
will solve this problem. Alternatively, we can argue that if players 2 and 
3 are using a fixed stragegy, then the sort of correlated history that under- 
lies this example is unlikely to occur. Either of these can provide a basis for 
the bound (4.2) and thus justify calendar-time bounds on experimentation 
along the lines sketched above; see the concluding remarks.  But, taking 
note of this example, we are forced to conclude that calendar-time limita- 
tions on experimentation  can be sharper than we would like,  at least in 
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And while our rationalization is a bit flawed, it is also based on a limited 
view of player  i's  deliberations.  In  this  respect,  we  reiterate  that  this 
rationalization  is not equivalent to the formal assumption. For one thing, 
if we  move outside  the  context  of extensive-form bandit  problems,  to 
cases in which a player believes his actions can affect the play of his rivals 
but that any effect vanishes with calendar time, the bound (4.2) still  has 
intuitive (and, excepting the problem raised by the example, formal) ap- 
peal. For another, asymptotic myopia permits more experimentation than 
would be called for in the story developed above, as it permits continued 
experimentation,  albeit at a vanishing rate, with strategies that are decid- 
edly suboptimal. This is permitted to encompass behavior of individuals 
who do not reason as described here, but who, for example, act in a fashion 
to  maximize  the long-run  (undiscounted)  average payoff they receive. ~4 
4.6.  A  Comment on Asymptotic Empiricism 
As a final comment, we return to the definition of asymptotic empiricism 
and, in particular, to the reason why (3.3) is required only for information 
sets that  are reached  a  nonvanishing  fraction of the time.  The question 
is, What credence do players give to evidence generated  at information 
sets visited infinitely often but a  vanishing  fraction of time? If a  player 
believes that  his rivals are playing the same strategy profile repeatedly, 
he ought to put a lot of credence in this evidence. But our formulation of 
asymptotic  myopia  suggests  two  reasons  that  such  evidence  might  be 
considered to be of lesser quality than data generated at an information 
set visited a nonvanishing fraction of the time. 
First, we assume players are asymptotically myopic using ex ante evalu- 
ation  of expected  payoffs.  Insofar  as  players  assess  vanishingly  small 
probability of reaching an information set that has been visited a vanishing 
fraction of the time,t5 their behavior at those information sets is relatively 
unconstrained by asymptotic myopia. Thus a player may believe that the 
actions of his rivals at information  sets visited a  vanishing frequency of 
time could be capricious and hence are too irregular to be predicted by 
the empirical frequencies of previous actions. 16 
t4 In bandit problems, any strategy that picks the short-run optimal action a fraction of 
the time that approaches one,  while picking each action infinitely often, will be average- 
payoff optimal almost surely. Of course, maximizing average payoffs is a notoriously weak 
criterion, admitting many optimal strategies. 
t5 This insofar has a purpose; this is not an implication of asymptotic empiricism. As the 
example in the previous subsection shows,  asymptotic independence may cause a  player 
to assess nonvanishing probability for reaching an information set that is never reached in 
the course of play. 
~6 Having introduced the notion that behavior might be capricious or (more to the point) 
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Second, as we have noted, calendar-time limitations on experimentation 
do little to restrict behavior at information sets reached a vanishing fraction 
of time. Choose h  E  H i,  and suppose that K(h; ~t) <  "0t for all t. Then i 
can choose any action, and in particular can act fairly capriciously, at 
information set h. Especially when a second playerj suspects that i will 
experiment in a way that is limited by this sort of calendar-time test but 
does not know the sequence {~t} that limits the experiments of player i, 
j  may be  relatively more  wary of data generated at h  if h  is  visited a 
vanishing frequency of time. 
5.  UNSTABLE  AND  LOCALLY  STABLE  STRATEGY  PROFILES 
We  next  provide  formal  "convergence  criteria"  that  we  will  use. 
Throughout this discussion, an extensive-form stage game is fixed. 
DEFINITION.  A learning model for the extensive-form stage game is 
an  array  of behavior and  beliefs  rules,  one  each  for each  player i.  A 
learning model is said to be conforming if  each beliefs rule is asymptotically 
empirical and each behavior rule is asymptotically myopic with calendar- 
time limitations on experiments, relative to the corresponding beliefs rule. 
Given any learning model (or, more simply, an array of behavior rules), 
we define in the usual fashion the induced probability measure over the 
space of complete histories ~. As long as there is no ambiguity about the 
fixed learning model, P  will denote this probability measure, and E  will 
denote expectation taken with respect to P. 
Whenever a conforming learning model is fixed, ¢r will refer to the array 
of behavior rules, ~  will refer to the array of "nonexperimental parts" of 
the behavior rules (as given by the definition of asymptotic myopia), and 
SO on. 
DEFINITION.  A strategy profile 7r, EII is unstable if there exists some 
e >  0 such that, for all conforming learning models, P(II~',(~,)  -   ,11 < 
for all t)  =  0. 
DEFINITION.  A strategy profile 7r, ~  H is locally stable if there exists 
some conforming learning model such that P(iim,__,~-t(~)  --  zr,) >  0. 
It should be clear that these definitions are mutually exclusive. It is not 
a priori obvious that they are  exhaustive, but Propositions 7.1  and 7.2 
will show that every strategy profile is either unstable or locally stable. 
poses problems as  well for actions taken where players are  close  to  indifferent, e.g.,  in 
situations where they are meant to be randomizing. Noisy payoffs, in the sense of Harsanyi's 
(1973)  work  on  purification,  can  be a  device for avoiding this sort of problem;  see,  for 
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Note that in both definitions, the "target"  profile ~-, is compared with 
the nonexperimental parts of each player's behavior rules and not with the 
behavior rules themselves.  For these definitions to have some empirical 
content, and in particular for the definition of local stability to have con- 
tent,  we will want to show that  the  strategies  actually played (given by 
the behavior rules) resemble to some extent the target strategy. 
Compared to the corresponding definitions from Fudenberg and Kreps 
(1993), three things are noteworthy. 
(1)  In  the  definition  of unstable  profiles  given  here,  e  must  work 
uniformly for all conforming models.  In Fudenberg and  Kreps (1993),  e 
is permitted  to vary with the  model of behavior and  beliefs. But (as  in 
fact noted  in  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  (1993))  all  the results  in the  earlier 
paper go through for the stronger definition here.~7 
(2)  On the other hand,  here we require  only that the probability of 
staying in the e-neighborhood of 7r, have prior probability zero; previously 
we required that this be true conditional on any partial history of previous 
play. But it is easy to see, given the uniformity of e over all conforming 
models, that this seemingly weaker requirement is equivalent: The dynam- 
ics  beginning  at  any  partial  history  of play  in  a  conforming  model  are 
precisely  the  sahae  as  the  dynamics  beginning  at  date  1 in  a  different 
conforming model. 
(3)  In the definition of local stability given here, there must be positive 
probability  of the  nonexperimental  part  of behavior converging  to  the 
target profile ex ante,  in some conforming model. In Fudenberg and Kreps 
(1993),  we required  that for a  fixed conforming model, for every e  >  0 
we could find a partial history such that convergence to the target strategy 
profile had conditional probability at least 1 -  e, conditional on the partial 
history. These are in fact equivalent;  cf. Lemma A.1  of Fudenberg and 
Kreps (1993). 
6.  SELF-CONFIRMING  EQUILIBRIA 
DEFINITION.  The strategy profile 7r,  is a self-confirming  equilibrium 
if for each player i there are beliefs y~ such that 
(a)  7r~ maximizes ui(Tr i, yi,),  and 
(b)  T~({Tr-i: 7rJ(h J)  =  7r~(hJ) for allj #  i and h J E  H(Tr,)})  =  1. 
In other words, self-confirming equilibrium requires that each player's 
strategy be a  best response to his beliefs and  that  each player's beliefs 
are correct along the equilibrium path of play. 
t7 In fact, the proofs given in the earlier paper are entirely adequate as given. 38  FUDENBERG AND  KREPS 
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FIG. 3.  A three-player horse-shaped game. 
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To illustrate how self-confirming equilibria can differ from Nash equilib- 
ria (in terms of the strategy profiles), consider the following two examples. 
EXAMPLE 6.1.  Inconsistent beliefs about the behavior of  a third player. 
Consider the game depicted in Fig.  3.  If players  1 and 2 have the  same 
beliefs about the strategy of player 3, one of them (or both) will strictly 
prefer  giving  3  the  move  over moving  across.  Thus  there  is  no  Nash 
equilibrium of this game in which the outcome is A  -  a.  But if player I 
believes player 3 will choose L with probability exceeding 2/3 and player 
2 will choose a  with positive probability, then player 1 prefers A to D. If 
player 2 believes player 3 will choose R  with probability exceeding 2/3 
and player 1 will choose A with positive probability, then player 2 prefers 
a  to d.  Thus there is a  (non-Nash)  self-confirming equilibrium  in which 
player I  chooses A  and player 2 chooses a, based on diverse beliefs by 
the two of them about the off-the-path strategy of player 3. 
EXAMPLE 6.2.  Persistent correlation in one player's beliefs about the 
strategies  of others.  In the game in  Fig.  4,  player  I  can play  U, which 
ends the game, or play L, M, or R, all  of which lead to a  simultaneous- 
move game between players 2 and  3,  neither  of whom observes player 
1  's action. The game between players 2 and 3 is a simple game of coordina- 
tion; the payoffs to them for a, a' are (6, 8), while d, d' gives payoffs (10, 
5), and a, d'  and d, a' both give zero payoff to both 2 and 3. 
If player  I  assesses that  player 2 chooses  a  with  probability p2  and 
player 3  chooses a'  with  probability p3,  independent  of the  actions  of 
player 2, it is straightforward  to show that  U is never l's best response. 
Thus  in  no  Nash  equilibrium  of this  game,  where  player  1 knows  the 
strategies  of players  2  and  3,  will  U  be chosen.  But  suppose player  1 
chooses  U. This  choice puts the information  sets of players 2 and 3 off 
the  path  of play,  and  so  player  1 can  entertain  correlated  conjectures 
about the strategic choices of 2 and 3.  In particular,  if player I believes 
that players 2 and 3 choose a  -  a' with probability close to 1/2 and d  - LEARNING IN  EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES 
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FIG. 4.  Illustrating correlation in off-the-path  assessments. 
39 
d'  with probability close to  1/2 (which requires correlated conjectures), 
U is  l's best response. Thus the choice of U (with certainty) is part of a 
self-confirming equilibrium. 
The phenomena that underpin these two examples--two players holding 
different beliefs about  the actions of a  third,  and one player ascribing 
correlation to the off-the-path actions of two rivals--necessarily entail at 
least three players.  For two-player extensive-form games, we have the 
following result, which is proved in the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION 6.1.  In  a  two-player  extensive-form  game,  every  self- 
confirming  equilibrium  is equivalent  to a  Nash  equilibrium  in  the sense 
that,  if 7r, is a  self-confirming  equilibrium  profile,  then  there  is a  Nash 
equilibrium  profile  qr which gives  the same distribution  on outcomes  as 
does rr.. 
7.  BASIC RESULTS 
PROPOSITION 7.1.  Every strategy profile ~r. that is not a self-confirming 
equilibrium  is unstable. 
PROPOSITION 7.2.  Every  strategy profile  ~r.  that  is a  self-confirming 
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Discussion and details of the proofs will be given in later subsections. 
In view of the widespread acceptance of the concept of a Nash equilibrium 
as the preeminent solution concept for extensive-form games, it is Proposi- 
tion 7.2 that is immediately more interesting. To illustrate this, we briefly 
indicate how the non-Nash self-confirming equilibria in Examples 6.1 and 
6.2 could be locally stable. 
EXAMPLE 6.1  (continued).  Consider the game depicted in Fig.  3 and 
any behavior profile in which player  I  chooses A  and  player 2 chooses 
a. Suppose player I begins believing that players 2 and 3 are playing fixed 
mixed strategies over and over, although he does not know which pair of 
strategies they are playing.  His initial  beliefs are given by the following 
probability distribution y] on II 2 x  I-I3: 
y l({TrZ(a) _< p, rr 3(L) <  q}) = plOOqlOO, 
for 0 --< p, q,  --<  1. Note that Yl is a product measure on 112 ×  i]3; player 
l's  strategic  uncertainty  about  the  strategies  used  by 2  and  3  exhibits 
independence.  Player  1 updates  his beliefs in the light of new evidence 
by using Bayes' rule in the manner of Eq.  (3.2). 
Player 2's initial and subsequent beliefs are similar in structure to player 
l's, beginning with the prior 
y~({rr i(A) <p, ~.3(R  ) <  q}) = plOOqlOO. 
Player 3's beliefs are unimportant. 
Because players  1 and  2  have  non-doctrinaire  prior  beliefs and  they 
update beliefs using Bayes' rule, their belief rules are asymptotically em- 
pirical. 
As for behavior rules,  suppose that all behavior is precisely myopic. 
Given his initial beliefs, player 1 assesses probability 
1  ~ lOOqJ°°dq =  I00/101 
that  player 3 will choose L given the opportunity, and that player 2 will 
choose  a  with  probability  I00/I01.  So  myopic optimization  leads  1 to 
choose A. Given his initial beliefs, player 2 assesses probability  100/101 
that  1 will choose A and 100/101  that 3 will choose R, so player 2 chooses 
a. The initial outcome is (A, a). 
When players update their beliefs given this  initial  outcome, player  1 
increases the mass on strategies in which 2 is likely to pick a, and player 
2 increases the mass on strategies in which 1 is likely to pick A. The exact 
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in the second round of play, neither 1 nor 2 changes beliefs about 3, hence 
neither changes her assessment of what 3 would do if given the chance 
to move.  Because no evidence was produced about the play of player 3, 
and  Is and  2s believe that  the strategies  used by their rivals  are drawn 
independently, there is no information in 2's play of a, for example, about 
what 3 might do. 
Hence in round  2,  1 chooses A  and  2 chooses a.  And  so on forever. 
The outcome in each round is (A, a). Supposing that 3's behavior is fixed, 
behavior profiles have converged (trivially) to a non-Nash self-confirming 
equilibrium profile. The point is very simple. Players  1 and 2 begin with 
disparate  beliefs on what  strategy 3 is likely to use.  This  leads them to 
behavior that  keeps 3 from moving.  And if 3 never moves, then  1 and 2 
have no opportunity to learn what 3 would in fact do, so that their disparate 
beliefs can persist. 
When confronted  with this  example,  colleagues often have asked the 
following question. Suppose that player 2 knows player 1  's payoff  function 
and knows that player 1 knows his own payoffs. Then when player 2 sees 
player  1 play A,  she can  infer that  player  1 expects player 3 to play L 
with  substantial  probability.  Should this  not lead player 2 to revise her 
beliefs about player 3 in the direction  of increasing  the probability that 
player  3  plays L?  In  the  spirit  of the  literature  on the  impossibility of 
players "agreeing  to disagree,"  should players  1 and  2 not end up with 
the  same beliefs about player 3? While we do not preclude this  sort of 
indirect  learning  in our model,  it need not take place.  First,  the indirect 
learning  supposes that  players know (or have strong beliefs about) one 
another's payoffs, which is consistent with our model but is not necessary 
for it.  If player 2 is unaware of player l's payoffs (and vice versa), then 
2 would not find it particularly surprising that  1 chooses A. Second, even 
if player 2 knows player l's payoffs (and knows that player I knows them), 
and hence is able to infer that player 1 believes player 3 is likely to play 
L, it is not clear that this will lead player 2 to revise her own beliefs. It 
is true that  player 2 will  revise her beliefs if she views the discrepancy 
between her own beliefs and player l's as due to information that player 
1 has received but player 2 has not.  But player 2 might also believe that 
1 has no objective reason for her beliefs and has simply made a mistake. 
The "agreeing to disagree" literature ensures that all differences in beliefs 
are attributable to differences in information by supposing that the players' 
beliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating from a common prior distri- 
bution. But assuming a common prior assumes away the key question of 
learning outside of equilibrium.  Indeed, the question of whether learning 
leads to Nash equilibrium would seem to be a special case of the question 
of whether (and when) learning leads to common posterior beliefs starting 
from arbitrary priors. To emphasize this point, recall that assuming players 
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lent to assuming that their beliefs correspond to a correlated equilibrium 
(Aumann,  1987), and assuming an independent common prior is equivalent 
to Nash equilibrium (Brandenburger and Dekel,  1987). 
EXAMPLE 6.2 (continued).  Suppose, in the game in Fig. 4, that player 
I begins with beliefs Y l that  take the following form: y t has an atom of 
mass 0.495 on the pure strategy profile (a, a'), an atom of mass 0.495 on 
the  pure  strategy  profile  (d,  d'),  and  the  remaining  0.01  probability  is 
uniformly distributed  over all  the possible (mixed)  strategy profiles that 
2 and 3 could employ. If player 1 uses Bayes' rule to update his beliefs, 
he has  a  beliefs rule  that  is asymptotically empirical  (because his  prior 
beliefs are  non-doctrinaire).  And  if his  behavior is  myopic,  with  these 
initial  beliefs, he will choose the action A. 
But if he chooses the action  U in the first round,  then players 2 and 3 
do not get a chance to move, and  l's beliefs going into the second round 
are identical with his beliefs in the first round. Again he chooses U, again 
he  learns  nothing,  and  play is  "trapped."  It is  straightforward  to flesh 
this  out into  a fully specified example  in  which there  is a  locally stable 
strategy profile that has  1 playing U with probability one, despite the fact 
that in all Nash equilibrium profiles,  U occurs with probability zero. 
We stress  that  this  does not rely on player  1 believing that  players 2 
and  3 actually  correlate  their  play.  To the  contrary,  player  1 is  certain 
that  they  do  not  do  so,  and  that  he  could  learn  which  (uncorrelated) 
strategy  profile they are  using by giving them  a  chance  to play enough 
times. (Moreover, a lot of information would probably be communicated 
in the first observation.) However if player 1 is impatient or for any other 
reason behaves myopically, he never finds out how they would behave. 
His persistent  strategic  uncertainty  means that  he persists  in correlated 
assessments of their play, which (given he behaves myopically) results in 
his persistent  strategic uncertainty. ~8 
7.2.  Proving  Proposition  7.1 
We will not give all  the details of the proof of Proposition 7.1,  relying 
instead  on a  detailed  sketch.  This  sketch,  while long and  cumbersome, 
is Where might the initial correlated beliefs of player  1 come from? Suppose that before 
the first play of the three-player game described above,  players  2 and 3 have repeatedly 
played a 2  x  2, two-player coordination game whose payoffs are exactly as in Fig. 4. That 
is, initially players 2 and 3 play a  game without a  player  1,  and then later on player  I  is 
added. Suppose further that player  1 does not observe play in the initial two-player game. 
It seems natural to suppose that players 2 and 3 will view their part of the game in Fig. 4 
as the same as the two-player game that preceeded it, and hence they will use their previous 
experience to guide  their play in the current game.  Player  I  (and we)  might assess  high 
probability that play in the initial two-player game has converged to one of the pure-strategy 
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will probably be incomprehensible to readers who are not familiar with 
the proofs of Lemma 6.2 and Proposition 6.1 from Fudenberg and Kreps 
(1993). 
Fix some strategy profile ~r, that is not a self-confirming equilibrium. 
LEMMA 7.1.  lf rr, is not a self-confirming equilibrium,  there exists an 
s'  >  0 and a player i' such that for all beliefs yi' such  that 
~, i'( { #  -i' . 
max 
i~i' ,hEHin-H(rr,) 
II#i(h ') -~*(h')ll  <  ~'})  >  1  -  s', 
there  exists  an  s i'  such  that  ui'(si',yi')>-ui'(rri',yi')  +  ~'  for  all 
,~" such  that II'~" -  '~'~1  <  ~'. 
Proof of the  Lemma.  This is  standard once we note that the set of 
profiles such that 
max  II~;(h i) -~-&(hi)ll  < 
i#i',hEHin-H(~r,) 
is compact, and tli'(.; .)  is continuous.  • 
Suppose that the profile rr. is not a  self-confirming equilibrium. Fix a 
player i' and an e' satisfying the conclusions of Lemma I, and let 
e  =  min {s'/2, ~r,(a)/2; a  E A, ~-,(a) >  0}. 
Suppose that for some conforming model, 
P({g : II~,(g,)  -  ~r41  <  ~ for all t}) >  0. 
Denote the event {~" I[,fi-,(~t) -  ~,11  <  ~ for all t} by A. 
The idea will be to show that with probability one on A, every informa- 
tion set h  E  H(~r.) is  hit a  nonvanishing frequency of time and that the 
empirical distribution of actions taken there lies within e of rr.. Thus by 
weak asymptotic empiricism, player i' will come to hold beliefs that force 
him (under the force of asymptotic myopia) to abandon anything within 
of lr ~ as the nonexperimental portion of his behavior rule (all of this, 
almost surely on A). This will then contradict the definition of A, giving 
a contradiction that proves the proposition. The reader familiar with the 
proof of Proposition 6.1  in Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) should be able 
to  see  all  the  steps  in  this  proof except for the first  step.  So  in what 
follows, we indicate how the first step is proved. 
We  "simulate" the  process  using an  independent family of uniform 
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be an independent family of uniform random variates.  (If the game has 
more than one initial node, a further sequence of uniform random variates 
is used to simulate the starting position. In the sketch to follow, we ignore 
this complication, to keep the exposition relatively simple.) At the initial 
information set h0, use the triple {X~ (h0) "i =  1,2,3} to simulate the action 
chosen by the player to whom h0 belongs. Specifically, let i 0 be this player, 
and let ¢r'~(~) be the prescribed behavior of this player in the first round 
of play. Write ¢r'~(~1) at h0 as &(h0, ~l)#ip(~l) +  (I -  &(h 0 , ~t))#'~(~l), where 
&(h0, ~t) is the probability that i0 initiates play without a permitted experi- 
ment, # '~(~  ~) is the nonexperimental portion of/o'S strategy, and ~-'i  0 repre- 
sents the experimental portion (if any).  Use xl(h0) to simulate a  choice 
of action at h0 according to #~  at h0, use x~(h o) to simulate a  choice of 
action at h0 according to ~t at h0, and use x](ho)  to simulate the bivariate 
random event whether to experiment or not. Depending on the results of 
this first stage of simulation, a second information set h j will be reached; 
use the triple {xi(hl):i =  1,2,3}  to simulate what action is taken at that 
information set, and so on. 
The key is this:  As each information set h  is reached in turn,  we use 
the triple {X~.(h) • i =  1,2,3},  where k is one plus the number of times that 
this  information  set has been  reached so far in the simulation.  That is, 
we do not use the" next" triple of uniform random variates for information 
set h  until, in the  simulation, h  is reached.  And each time we  simulate 
what goes on at a  particular information set,  we use the first variate in 
the  triple  to  simulate the  nonexperimental  portion  of the  strategy,  the 
second  to  simulate  the  experimental  portion,  and  the  third  to  decide 
"whether to experiment," if (according to the player's decision rule) there 
is a  chance that he will conduct an experiment in that round. 
As long as we stay within the event A in our simulation, whenever we 
simulate the  nonexperimental  portion  of a  player's  strategy,  we  use  a 
distribution over actions that is within e of ~r, (for that action). Hence by 
an adaptation of the strong law of large numbers, with probability one on 
A, for every information set h hit infinitely often, the empirical frequencies 
with which action a  E  A(h)  is taken in the nonexperimental portion  of 
the strategy has limit superior no larger than 7r,(a)  +  e and limit inferior 
no smaller than 7r,(a)  -  e.  (See Lemma 6.2 from Fudenberg and Kreps 
(1993).) 
Of course, this does not imply that the frequencies of actions actually 
taken at information sets that are reached infinitely often have lim sups 
and lim infs within these ranges, because the action actually taken depends 
on whether an experimental action is taken and, if so, what action that 
experiment  is.  But  we  claim that for information sets  h  E  H(Tr,),  the 
frequency of visits to h (almost surely on A) has strictly positive lim inf. 
Thus  as  calendar  time  goes  to  infinity, the  number  of times  in  which 
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tation  will  have  no  impact  on  the  lim inf and  lim sup  of the  empirical 
frequencies. 
To show that for information sets h E  H(Tr,) the frequency of visits to 
h has strictly positive lim inf (almost surely on A) involves an induction 
on the length of the shortest path of positive probability (under 7r,) from 
the  initial  node  (or,  an  initial  node)  to h.  The  initial  information  set is 
certainly reached with nonvanishing frequency. Take any one-action path 
of positive probability, starting  at the initial node. (Let a  be this action, 
and let h be the information  set reached.) The lim inf of the occurrence 
of  a  in  the  nonexperimental  portion  of the  behavior  rule  is  at  least 
~r,(a)  -  e which is strictly positive, and since the initial  information  set 
is reached a nonvanishing frequency of the time, the lim inf of the occur- 
rence  of a  in  the  actual  strategy  (with experiments)  is the  same as  the 
lim inf of the occurrence of a  in the nonexperimental  portions. Thus the 
lim inf frequency with which h is reached is at least ~r,(a)  -  e, which is 
strictly positive. The induction  step should now be apparent.  • 
7.3.  Proof of Proposition 7.2 
Once again we g.ive only a sketch. The reader is presumed to be familiar 
with the proof of Proposition 6.3 from Fudenberg and Kreps (1993). 
We mimic this proof almost verbatim. That is, we construct a conform- 
ing model in which behavior is precisely myopic, i.e., no experimentation 
takes place, or -h" =  ~', and in each round each player chooses a strategy 
that is precisely short-run  optimal.  Players begin with the beliefs y~, that 
support (in the fashion of a  self-confirming equilibrium)  play of ~.,  and 
they persist in playing 7r. and believing 7. unless and until data build up 
that make continued belief in y~ impossible. As long as players continue 
to play according to ~-., information sets in the complement of H(~r.) are 
unreached, so there is no need to change beliefs about what will transpire 
there. And then, as in the proof of Proposition 6.3 (Fudenberg and Kreps, 
1993) one can set the force of asymptotic empiricism so that, with positive 
probability, what transpires  is insufficient to have players abandon their 
belief in 7~. The details are tedious but straightforward. 
8.  UNSTABLE OUTCOMES 
A strategy profile is unstable if there is zero probability that the nonex- 
perimental portion of behavior remains forever within an arbitrarily small 
neighborhood of the target  strategy. This definition does not distinguish 
between (nonexperimental) behavior at on-the-path and off-the-path infor- 
mation sets. 
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definition and thus a  stronger result is available. When a  strategy profile 
is not a self-confirming equilibrium, the proof shows that a defection must 
occur along the path of play. This suggests  that Proposition 7.1  can be 
extended to show that outcomes that do not arise from any self-confirming 
equilibrium are unstable in an appropriate sense. This extension requires 
some notation and a definition. 
An outcome is a probability distribution over the endpoints of the game 
tree; we use p  to denote a  typical outcome. For a  strategy profile ,r, we 
write p(zr) to denote the outcome engendered by 7r. It is trivial that p(.) 
is a continuous function of ,r. 
An outcome p is a self-confirming equilibrium outcome if there is some 
self-confirming equilibrium  strategy  profile 7r  such  that  p  =  p(qr).  An 
outcome is not a  self-confirming equilibrium outcome if there is no self- 
confirming equilibrium that gives this outcome. 
DEFINITION.  The  outcome  p,  is  unstable  if  there  exists  e  >  0 
such that for every conforming model,  the probability that  - 
p.[[ <  e for all t is zero. 
PROeOSITION  8.1  If p  is  not  a  self-confirming  equilibrium  outcome, 
then p  is unstable. 
Here is  a  sketch of the proof.  For any outcome/9, let X(p) andH(p) 
denote, respectively, the collections of action nodes in the game tree and 
information sets whose successors (among terminal nodes) have positive 
probability under P.  For x  E  X(p) and a  E  A(h(x)), define 
tk(p)(x, a) -  p(Z(x, a)) 
o((Z(x))  ' 
where Z(x) is the set of all terminal successors of x and Z(x, a) is the set 
of all terminal successors of (x, a). The following are easily established. 
(1)  For a  general  outcome O,  there may exist nodes x  and x' from 
the  same  information  set  h  and  a  E  A(h)  such  that  qJ(p)(x,  a)  # 
q,(p) (x',  a). 
(2)  If p  =  p(Tr) for some legitimate strategy It, then qJ(O)(x, a) =  7r(a) 
for all x  E  X(p) and a  E  A(h(x)). Thus, for a given outcome P, if there is 
a  strategy zr with p(¢r)  =  p,  then for all nodes x, x'  E  X(O)  such that x 
and x' come from the same information set h, and for all actions a available 
at that information set, qJ(p)(x,  a)  =  qJ(O)(x',  a). 
(3)  Conversely, suppose that qJ(p)(x,  a) =  qJ(O)(x',  a) for all nodes x, 
x'  E  X(p) such that x  and x' are in the same information set and for all 
a  E  A(h(x)).  Then  any  strategy  7r  such  that  7r(a)  =  d/(p)(x  ,  a)  for 
x  E  X(p) and a  E  A(h) satisfies p  =  p(~-). 
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For each outcome p, define 
II6o)  =  {~r •  1-I :p(~r)  =  p}. 
Note that II60) is the empty set for a given p when the antecedent of (3) is 
violated; when the antecedent of (3) is satisfied, then (3) gives an alternate 
characterization of 11(0).  It is clear from this alternate characterization 
that II60) is closed. Moreover, if or, ~r'  E  I-I60), then zr is identical to ~r' 
for all h  E  H60).  Finally, I-I60) has a  product structure: If or, ¢r'  •  1-I60) 
and we construct a  strategy which composes 7r i for some players and ¢r'J 
for the rest, this third strategy will also lie in II60). 
Fix an outcome p,, whose stability (more precisely, whose unstability) 
is to be investigated. If 1-I60,) is empty, then there exists some e >  0 such 
that IIp( ,) -  041  >  ~ for every strategy or, and thus p, must be unstable 
by definition. ~9 Thus we can assume w.l.o.g, that, for the given p,, 1-160,) 
is nonempty. Let zr, be any (arbitrarily selected) member of 1160,).  Note 
that ~-, is completely determined by p, at information sets from H60,). 
We  are  done  if we  show  that  P,  is  unstable  under  the  assumption 
that 1-160,) contains no self-confirming equilibrium strategy profile. First, 
Lemma 7.1  is extonded: 
LEMMA 8.1.  IfF160,) contains no self-confirming  equilibrium profiles, 
there exists an e'  >  0 and a player i such that for all beliefs y i such that 
7"({#-;:  max  [l#J(h)-~rJ,(h)ll<~'})>l-~  ', 
j#i,h~H#l-H(o,) 
(8.1) 
there exists an s i such that ui(s i, yi) >_ ui(,iri  ,)/i)  +  ~' for all 71  "i such that 
sup  [[~"(h)  -  ~"*(h)ll  <  ~'.  (8.2) 
hE-H(.o,)NH i 
In other words, this says that if player i believes that others are likely 
to play in a  manner that would give the outcome p,,  then i will prefer 
some strategy that causes the outcome to differ from P,. 
Proof of Lemma 8.1.  Suppose to the contrary that for each integer n, 
" such that (8.1)  for each player i there exist beliefs 7/and  a  strategy 7r, 
and (8.2) hold for e'  =  I/n and such that ui(s i, 7 / ) <  i  i  i  u(rr., y.)  +  l/n for 
all s i. Let 7r. be the profile where each player plays 7r/. Since the probabil- 
19 Suppose there exists ~r, such that [Ip(~r,)  -  P,l] -<  l/n for each n. Take a  subsequence 
along  which ¢r, converges to,  say,  7r,,  and  use the continuity of p(.)  and  ~  to  derive a 
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ity  of any  outcome  is  the  product  of the  probabilities  of the  actions 
along  the  corresponding  path  through  the  tree,  (8.2)  ensures  that 
IIP(~r,)  -  P*ll <- K/n,  where K  is the length  of the longest path  through 
the tree. 
Now take a subsequence along which ~r, and all the Yl, converge. Denote 
the limit strategy profile by ~r= and the limit beliefs by y~. By continuity, 
p(~'=) =  P*, and ~-~ is a self-confirming equilibrium,  supported by beliefs 
y;. This contradiction  proves the lemma.  • 
To complete the proof of the proposition, note that as long as players 
are playing strategies whose nonexperimental parts give an outcome suffi- 
ciently close to P., information sets h ~  H(cr.) will (almost surely) be hit 
with nonvanishing frequency. (This takes an induction argument as in the 
proof of Proposition 7. !.) Thus the empirical frequencies of behavior at 
those information  sets will be close to that (uniquely) mandated for all ~r 
E  II(p.).  Applying asymptotic myopia and weak asymptotic empiricism 
completes the proof.  • 
9.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
9.1.  On Strategically  Equivalent  Extensive-Form  Games 
Since  self-confirming  equilibrium  requires  beliefs to be correct  along 
the equilibrium  path  of play,  it is inherently  an extensive-form solution 
concept,  in  contrast  to  Nash  equilibrium,  which  can  be defined  on the 
strategic  form  of the  game.  Two extensive-form games  with  the  same 
strategic form can have different sets of self-confirming equilibria. 
By virtue of Propositions  7.1,  7.2,  and  8.1,  we have made a  case for 
the appropriateness  of self-confirming equilibrium as a  solution concept 
in the learning  story we have been telling.  This  story suggests that  two 
extensive-form games that give rise to the same strategic-form game might 
be played differently. Put succinctly, when players are learning, how much 
of their opponents'  strategies is revealed matters, and this might depend 
on the extensive form of the game. 
Contrast this with the position taken by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), 
that the strategic form encodes all  the strategically relevant information, 
and two extensive-form games with the same reduced strategic form will 
be played in the same way. This position has been challenged in the past, 
for  example  on  grounds  that  extensive-form  presentation  might  affect 
strategic  expectations  and  thus actual play (e.g.,  in Kreps,  1990).  Here 
we see a different sort of challenge to this story. In our view, the general 
problem with the position of Kohlberg and Mertens (except as an assertion 
about  the  play  of mythical,  completely  rational  beings)  is  that  it  does 
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equilibrium  is reached.  When these issues are raised,  their  satisfactory 
resolution may be misguided by the notion of strategic equivalence. 
9.2.  Nonvanishing  Trembles and Almost-Nash Equilibria 
While  our  results  indicate  that  serf-confirming  equilibria  (profiles  or 
outcomes) that are not Nash can be locally stable, there are ways in which 
our story can be modified that gets us "back" to Nash as the appropriate 
reduced form solution concept. The story of this sort that we like the best 
is based on a supposition that players actively experiment with suboptimal 
strategies and/or actions in a way that generates enough information about 
off-the-path behavior to preclude  non-Nash  stable points.  This  story is 
quite complex, however, and is the subject of a companion paper (Fuden- 
berg and Kreps,  1994). 
A second story is short and can be given here. Suppose players "trem- 
ble,"  in the  sense of Selten's trembling-hand  perfection.  To be precise, 
suppose that for every action a  E  A  there is a  small probability e, >  0 
such that  for each  a  E  A i,  player i cannot  reduce the  probability with 
which a is chosen to less than e~. These lower bounds are uniform in time 
and across histories. (Nothing significant changes if the lower bounds are 
time and history dependent, as long as they approach some strictly positive 
limit almost  surely.) This  ensures  that  every information  set is  reached 
with positive probability,  so that for asymptotic empiricism and myopia 
defined more or less as above (allowing for these trembles),  every non- 
Nash strategy profile of the tremble-constrained  game is unstable, z° 
9.3.  Statistical  Tests and Odd Histories 
Our formulations of asymptotic empiricism and asymptotic myopia are 
predicated,  at least  implicitly,  on a  belief by each player that  his rivals 
will  (asymptotically) play the  same  strategy  profile repeatedly  and  that 
the  play  of different  rivals  will  be independent.  But the  data provided 
along particular histories can confound this hypothesis of asymptotic sta- 
bility. We saw instances of this in the subsection on asymptotic indepen- 
dence and in the troublesome example of Section 4 (concerning the value 
of information in experiments). But other examples could be created, e.g., 
where the rivals of player i seem to be playing in some cyclical pattern. 
We have insisted on asymptotic empiricism and asymptotic myopia along 
all  histories,  including  those  that  present  evidence  against  asymptotic 
20 Moreover, Nash equilibria of the constrained game are exactly the e-constrained equilib- 
ria that Selten uses to define perfection. A  trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is the limit 
point of e-constrained equilibria as e converges to zero. Thus for small e, Nash profiles that 
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stability.  It  seems,  therefore,  that the  behavioral  assumptions are  too 
strong. 
Note  that for our results,  the  sorts  of odd  histories that would cast 
doubt on asymptotic stability would have probability zero. That is, our 
results concern situations in which behavior is settling into repeated play 
of a given strategy profile;  2t and so strong-law type results tell us that odd 
histories are unlikely to be seen. 
This suggests a way in which we can weaken the behavioral postulates 
that we make, without much change to our fundamental results. We can 
imagine that each player at each date looks at the history of play and tests 
statistically whether it seems that play is asymptotically stable. If the data 
lead to a rejection of this basic hypothesis, the player is not constrained 
either to hold asymptotically  empirical beliefs or to act in an asymptotically 
myopic manner. 
For the results in this paper, it is unnecessary to include these sorts of 
statistical tests.  For Fudenberg and Kreps (1994),  these statistical tests 
become crucial, and hence we leave precise formulations and details to 
that companion paper.  We wish only to signal here that this concept of 
statistical tests could be  used in the current context to give us greater 
confidence in the assumptions of asymptotic empiricism and myopia. 
9.4.  Learning about the Extensive Form 
In our formulation of asymptotic empiricism, we  have assumed that 
players  know  the  informational structure  of the  extensive-form  stage 
game.  (Of course,  this  was  crucial  to  asymptotic independence.)  It  is 
certainly possible to imagine situations in which a player is not sure about 
the  informational structure  of the  stage  game; e.g.,  he  may be  unsure 
whether his opponents observe his action before choosing their own. In 
this situation, players would infer what they can about the information 
structure from the history of play. While we do not pursue this idea here, 
we do  wish  to  indicate that  it  also can be  used,  in part,  to ameliorate 
concerns we may have about asymptotic independence or the calendar- 
time limitations we imposed on conscious experimentation. 
APPENDIX:  PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1 
Fix a self-confirming equilibrium profile 7r,. Let 3"* (for i =  1, 2) be the 
beliefs that together with ~r, satisfy (a) and (b) in the definition of a self- 
confirming equilibrium. The first step of the proof is to construct a strategy 
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profile #  such that (1) for i =  1, 2, 
idi(7.gi, ,.~-i)  =  ui(q.g.i, ")l~),  (A.I) 
where in the expression on the left-hand side, the second argument ~r-; 
is shorthand for beliefs that put a unit mass on  -i  using the strategy #-i, 
and (2) #  agrees with 7r. at all information sets h  E  H0r.). 
To find "~', we use Kuhn's theorem (Kuhn,  1953),  which establishes a 
correspondence between behaviorally mixed strategies and mixed strat- 
egies. 
Specifically, recalling that I-I i is the set of behavior strategies of player 
i and  letting A(S i)  be  the  space  of mixed strategies for player i, define 
yi: FI i ~  A(S i)  by 
Yi(Tri)(Si)  =  1-~  7"gi(si(h))  • 
hEH i 
For every 7r; E  11 i, Yi(Tr i) is one among many mixed strategies equivalent 
to ~r; in the sense that, whatever -  i does, the distribution over endpoints 
if i uses Yi(Tri) is identical with the distribution if i uses zr i. (This specific 
choice of Yi(Tr;) corresponds to independent randomizations by a player 
at each of his information sets.) 
We also define q~i. A(S i) ~  Hi such that for every o -i  E  A(Si),  ~i(cri) 
is equivalent to cr i. This takes a bit more work. 
For each information set h  ~  H i, let Ha(h)  =  {h' E  Hi: h' <  h} and let 
H~ (h) =  {h' ~  H i" h' 7  ~ h, h' ¢  h}. (Because the game has perfect recall, 
the notion of precedence among information sets of a single player is well 
defined.) Let Si(h)  be all strategies by i that do not preclude h. That is, 
s i E  Si(h)  if, for every h'  E  H&(h),  si(h ')  specifies the single action  in 
A(h'),  denoted by a(h',  h),  that allows play to continue to h. Otherwise, 
s i is unrestricted. That is, if we define Si(h)  =  1-Ih,EW~h)A(h'),  then there 
is a obvious one-to-one correspondence between Si(h) and A(h)  x  -Si(h). 
For a  E  A(h)  for h  E  H i,  define 
....  i  i 
q.ti(o.i)(a)  =  •{s'  : s'~S'U,),s'(h)=a}  O" (S  ) 
~'{si : siESi(h)} o'i(s i) 
In cases where the denominator is zero, any definition will do. 
Now define ~" by 
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for i  =  1, 2. That is, we construct player i's strategy out of -i's  beliefs; 
for each ~'i in  the  support of ~/-~, we  pass  to the  corresponding mixed 
strategy,  average over y-i, and  then reconvert to a  behaviorally mixed 
strategy. 
We claim that #; agrees with zr. at information sets h E  H(zr.). To this 
end, fix some information set h  E  H(~'.) and assume that player i moves 
at h. 
Let  ~i(h)= l-lh,eH~(h) A(A(h'));  that  is,  ~i  specifies  behavior  by  i 
at  information  sets  m  Hi(h).  Since  h  ~  H(~-,),  so  is  h'  for  every 
h'  E  Hi(h).  Since  beliefs y~,  are  not  disconfirmed (see  part  (b)  of the 
definition of a  self-confirming equilibrium),  every 7r i in  the  support  of 
,)/~¢i agrees  with ~'~, on h  and on h'  E  H~>(h). We can therefore think of 
y', as the product of  a probability distribution ~ -" on H;(h) and a degenerate 
measure (at rr,) on the other components of a full behavior strategy. With 
this definition, for any s i E  S i we can write 
Sn; Y;(rri)(s;)y~;itdrr;] = Sn' I,e]e-[  H ~r;(si(h'))Y~;tdrril 
as 
h'~_H~(h) 
i(  si( h ,) ).  ~ -i[ d Nil]. 
Moreover, if s i E  Si(h),  we  know that si(h ')  =  a(h',  h) for h'  E  Hi(h), 
so we can simplify this term further to 
h'El~(h) 
i  !  which, letting K  be the constant 1-Ih,eH~th) 7r,(a(h  , h)),  is 
h'EH~(h) 
Use the definitions of ~i and yi to write out #i(a) (from (A.2)) in full 
detail: 
(ri(a) = 
~'{sieSi(h1'si(h)=a}  fW 1--[h'eHi Iri(si(h'))'Y*i[d"tri] 
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(Since  yg" is  correct  along the  path  of play and  we  are  looking at  an 
information  set  along  the  path,  the  denominator of this  expression  is 
nonzero,  and  so  the  definition applies.)  From  the  previous  steps,  the 
numerator immediately simplifies to 
g'lTi~(a)[siE_~i~(hS-~i(h }  1-I  ~i(-si(h'))'~-i[d~i]]  • 
h' el-lJ~ (h) 
i  --i  .  .  --i  --i  ~  ---i  i  Define K'  =  E~ es (h) f~'cl0 I-Ih'eH~(hJ  7r (S (h))y  [d-ff  ], and this means that 
the numerator is K" K' • ~r ~(aT. The denominator is slightly more complex: 
I(a','g')~.A(I)x'Si 
h)  "/r~(at) (''  l-I  ~i(-gi(h'))7-i[dNi]] 
K  ~  3"~'(h) h'elt~(h) 
=K  7r'*(a'){~ie?~(h S~;(h  )  I-I  ~i(-si(h'))~-i[d~i]} 
a'EA(h)  h' EH~ (h) 
or 
K  ~  7r~(a'){K'}  = K'K"  ~'~  7r/,(a ') = K'K'. 
a'EA(h)  a'EA(h) 
Dividing the numerator by the denominator cancels the K. K' terms, and 
we are left with #i(a)  =  rri,(a). 
The rest  is easy.  Because rr,  is a  self-confirming equilibrium relative 
to the y',, 
ui(~ i,, y i,) >  ui(rr i, y i,)  for all 7r i E  H i. 
Thus by (A.1), 
ui(Ti.i~, ~T-i)  ~  tli(,.rt.i, #-i)  for all 7r i E  1-I i. 
Since ~-~, is identical to #i at all information sets that are hit with positive 
probability (under rr,, hence under #), we know that 
idi(,.i.t.i~, #-i)  =  idi(#i,  #-i). 
Thus we know that 
ui(~.fi, #-i)  ~  ui(,lr i, ~.f-i)  for all ¢r i E  H i 54 
(and  for  i  = 
profile.  • 
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1,  2),  which  means that  ¢r  is  a  Nash  equilibrium strategy 
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